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Resumen: Este artículo explora las políticas de defensa y seguridad de Suecia, en vista de las viejas y nuevas realidades geopo-
líticas. Una amplia investigación de documentos y entrevistas fueron la base empírica para probar algunas hipótesis: 1) la 
política interna tuve pocas consecuencias sobre las políticas; 2) influencia en la seguridad a través de programas inovadores; 3) 
la cooperación industrial y asociaciones estratégicas mejoraron la base industrial de defensa; y 4) la contribución a la seguridad 
internacional a través de la participación activa en la ONU, la OTAN y las misiones de paz de la UE. Ambos gobiernos social-
demócrata y moderado en cambio, han mostrado un gran pragmatismo. Una nueva administración pública se desarrolló en 
países que salieran de la esfera soviética. Cooperación y alianzas estratégicas son ahora responsables por un aumento de la 
capacidad industrial-tecnológica en Suecia y paises socios. Una mayor participación en las misiones de paz amplio la influencia 
de Suecia internacionalmente. El cambio de la neutralidad a el no alineamiento mejor traduce los desafíos geopolíticos actuales 
en el norte de Europa, el Ártico y las regiones del Báltico. Estos resultados implican que nuevas preocupaciones de seguridad 
están presentes y deben ser consideradas por los politicos responsables. 
 
Palabras clave: Defensa y Seguridad de Suécia; Política Comun de Defensa y de Seguridad de la UE; Gestión de crise; Las 
misiones de paz; Política Exterior y de Cooperación Industrial.  
 
Summary: This article explores Sweden´ s defence and security policies in view of old and new geopolitical realities. Extensi-
ve document research and interviews were the empirical basis for testing hipotheses: 1) internal politics had little consequence 
over policies; 2) influence on security through innovative programmes; 3) industrial cooperation and strategic partnerships 
improved defence industrial base; and 4) contributing to International Security through active participation in UN, NATO and 
EU peace missions. Both Social-Democratic and Moderate governments have rather shown a great pragmatism. A new public 
administration was developed in countries emerging from the Soviet sphere. Cooperation and strategic partnerships are now 
responsible for an increased industrial-technological capacity in Sweden and partners. Increased peace missions participation 
enlarged international Sweden’s influence. Changing from neutrality to non-alignment better translates the current geopolitical 
challenges in Northern Europe, Arctic and Baltic regions. These results imply that new security concerns are present and 
should be considered by policy-makers.  
Keywords: Sweden Defense and Security Policy; EU Common Defence and Security Policy; Crisis Management; Peace 
Missions; Foreign Policy and Industrial Cooperation.   
 
1. Introduction 
This paper seeks to identify the bases for Swedish defense and security policies,  including co-
operation in the defence industry and markets and on security issues with the European Union (EU) 
after 1991. Sweden faced a range of radically new internal and international problems with the end of 
the Cold War. A new post-Cold War political environment restructured these issues,  which were 
exacerbated by the financial crisis in the beginning of the 1990s.  If until then successive social-
democratic,  centrist or moderate governments were adopting full employment and social welfare 
policies, scientific and cutting-edge technology development (particularly for the defense industry),  in 
1991 the new Conservative government adopted policies to combat inflation and the financial crisis,  
which entailed, at the same time, currency devaluation.   
In 1994, the minority Social-Democratic government (sui generis Swedish institution where 
the minority party can lead a government provided the opposition cannot form a government or force 
new elections),  imposed significant 10% cuts on defense and security programs between 1996 and 
2001, which were fully justified by the financial crisis and budget crunch (The Renewal of Defence 
Policy 1996).  
When Sweden joined European Union in 1995, and subsequently occupied its presidency,  
there was a synchronization process of Swedish and European policies: Sweden incorporated Europe-
an defense and security policies, and, at the same time, downloaded its successful defense and securi-
ty policies. Concepts and practices such as Crisis Management were an important Swedish contribu-
tion to the European agenda for peace and regional and global security.  Crisis Management is an 
arrangement of research and training programme developed in the mid-1990s at the Swedish National 
Defence College (now called Swedish Defence University) by the founder of the Crisis Management 
Research and Training Center,  Professor Bengt Sundelius and its former director,  Eric Stern, shortly 
after the end of the Cold War.  
Concurrently, Sweden participated in the Balkans Conflict with North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP), at operations in Macedonia even without being a mem-
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ber of that organization. The new agenda of Swedish international security cooperation was expanded 
with peace operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Afghanistan.  
On the other hand, Sweden´ s prominence in technological innovations was an important driver 
of intense economic and defense industry cooperation with major European defence companies 
through joint ventures and merges, or on offset arrangements.  Similarly, Sweden also increased its 
policy of internationalization of defense material production towards South Africa,  Brazil,  and India 
reaffirming its ability to adapt to new defense geopolitics and geo-economics circumstances through 
strategic partnerships and industrial cooperation with emerging countries.  
New geopolitical threats posed changes in the political and geographic situation in northern 
Europe --such as deterioration of Swedish-Russian relations due to Russia’s resurgence as an im-
portant strategic actor in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea, a new configuration of Finland-Sweden safety 
organizations, a set of modifications in the Nordic Council,  the partial association with NATO, the 
Russian annexation of Crimea--,  all these suggesting that Sweden is preparing to the new geopolitical 
realities of the 21st century.  Thus, the emergence of these threats pose new requirements like the 
need of expanding military cooperation at the regional and at the global level,  implying in changes for 
its defense and security policies.  
 
2.  Political and institutional challenges: internal and external 
2.1. Parties and defense and security policy during the Cold War 
The Swedish corporatist political culture has given rise to an alliance of interests among gov-
ernment, military, industry, and trade unions around defense questions, and,  above all,  made it pos-
sible for defense problems to enter the political agenda allowing military technology experts and sci-
entists determine the level of the country' s military needs (Stenlås, 2008).   
During the 23 years (1946-1969) that Sweden was run by the Social-Democratic Party (Sveri-
ges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti,  S) this country had its greatest expansion of the Industrial-
Technological Military Base.  The treats of Cold War and the requirements imposed to defend the 
territory also prevailed among the priorities of then Prime Minister Tage Erlander,  who pushed im-
plementation of Swedish progressive social welfare policies. As a result,  Sweden had the ability to 
enhance its independence with regard to NATO or to the Warsaw Pact,  and to keep its historic neu-
trality,  while assuring its indigenous military technological development. Direct government invest-
ment in Research & Development and large defence acquisition budgets caused Sweden have the 
highest military expenditures per capita of democratic countries,  substantiated by expanding defence 
industries such as SAAB (Lansen, Saab 37 Viggen, JAS 39 Grippen), submarines and warships at 
Kokums, anti-aircraft guns and missiles at Bofors,  tanks and armored cars at Hägglunds (today asso-
ciated with BAESystem Hägglunds) were priorities between 1948-1990.  
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Figure 1 Governments of Sweden, End of World War II to 1991 
Prime Minister Party  Years in Power  
Tage Erlamder Social- Democratic  1946-1969 - 23 years 
Olof Palme Social- Democratic 1969-1976 - 6 years 
Thorbjorn Falldin Centre1 1976-1978 - 2 years 
Ola Ullsten Moderate2 1978-1979 - 1 year 
Thorbjorn Falldin Centre 1979-1982 - 3 years 
Olof Palme Social-Democratic 1982-1985 - 3 ½  years 
Ingvar Carlsson Social- Democratic 1985-1991 - 5 years 
Author’s elaboration  
The Swedish corporatism worked with well-oiled agreements between big business and trade 
unions, with strong consensus among political parties of the Swedish Democratic Left,  the bureaucra-
cy, the unions, and the industries. Sweden, like other countries, has "non-competitive interest associ-
ations, hierarchically ordered, pigeon-holed by sectors exercising monopolies of representation.. ." in 
exchange of controlling choice of leaders and articulation of demands and support (Schmitter 1974: 
93-99). Schmitter employs corporatism as a unified interest representation system, hierarchical,  
whereas trade unionism is defined as system of aggregation of interests.  The corporatist model that 
produced the Swedish Welfare State persists even with the prevailing liberalism since 1990,  including 
industry, political parties,  banks, and trade unions.  
Most analysts agree that Sweden had credible defence capabilities upon which it relied for any 
attack in its territory.  For example, Sweden had 320 combat airplanes and 230 territorial defence 
units in 1990, whereas only 100 jetfighters and O (zero) defence units,  in 2009 (International Defence 
Cooperation, 2014:22, Table 4.1).  Sweden has maintained a strong defence and introduced policies to 
maintain a competitive high-tech national defence industry to supply its forces with materiel in case of 
a war. 
Historically tense, Russia-Sweden relations were all but peaceful during the Cold War, in spite 
of Sweden´ s neutrality.  The Soviet Union frequently challenged Sweden by intruding in Swedish 
waters of the Baltic Sea, as close as the Stockholm archipelago. 3 But protection was secretly granted 
by NATO and the US, as later unveiled in the book Den Dolda Alliansen (Holmström 2012). Succes-
sive governments build a strong Air Force, implementing policies which increased spending in re-
search, technology, and development of innovative aeronautical products.   
 
2.2. Parties and Policies of Defense and Post Cold War Security 
2.2.1. Defence Industrial and Technology Policy 
The new government led by the Moderate Party (Moderaterna - "moderate") won the elections 
in 1991. Between 1991 and 1995, Prime Minister Carl Bildt quickly proposed a new Defence Resolu-
tion (1991) in which prevailed the idea of a smaller defense, but with more quality.  Due to the finan-
cial crisis of the early 1990s,  defense material acquisitions were made in the market,  when there was 
a surplus of low-price Eastern Europe defence equipment,  much accordingly to the prevailing liberal 
temper at the time (Noll 2007: 16).  
                                                 
1 Center Party - name given to the Agrarian Party with the change of names in 1958.  
2 Moderate Party – liberal-conservative party, the largest center-right party of Sweden.  
3 “Swedish Navy reports chasing off a submarine with depth charges”.  AP. Published 9 June 1982.  
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/09/world/swedish-navy-reports-chasing-off-a-submarine-with-depth-charges.html.   These skirmishes continued 
until recently as shown by a Daily Mail report http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2799091/sweden-steps-search-crippled-russian-
submarine-making-mayday-distress-call-coast.html.   Access 15 October 2016.  
 
 
 
Revista de Estudios Europeos,  n. 68, julio-diciembre, 2016                                                                      rEe 
 
78 
 
Figure 2 - Governments of Sweden, 1991-2014 
Prime Minister Party  Years in Power  
Carl Bildt Moderate 1991-1994 - 3 years 
Ingvar Carlsson Social- Democratic 1994-1996 - 1 ½  years  
Göran Persson Social- Democratic 1996-2006 - 10 years 
Fredrik Reinfeldt Moderate 2006-2014 - 8 years  
Stefan Löfven Social- Democratic 2014+  
Author’s elaboration 
   
 After joining the European Union in 1995, Sweden elected a new minority government led 
by Göran Persson (Social-Democratic Party, S),  which substantially changed defence policies and 
military capacities internally.  From 1996 on, the parties reached a consensus that defence and securi-
ty were a priority issue for the country in view of the restriction posed on military needs and conse-
quent reduction of military spending, and its effects.   
 The political changes resulted in a reorganization of the Defence Commission in the Riksdag 
(Swedish Parliament) to draft a reform in the Defence and Security Policy (The Renewal of Sweden' s 
Defence Policy, 1996). Two main problems have been the object of reform: 1) the system of recruit-
ment by conscription; and 2) the difficulties facing the national defence industry - once so dependent 
on national government procurement, now smaller because of cessation of threats caused by the Cold 
War, and due to the financial crisis that brought budget cuts in the defence sector.  Under the 1996 
budget cuts,  the proportion of new defence equipment acquisitions rose from 20% to 50% of defence 
expenditure.  Between 1999 and 2006 it dropped to 45% of defence spending; and after 2006, with the 
Moderate Government of Fredrik Reinfeldt,  this proportion fell further to 30%. 4 
 The Defence Resolution 1997-2001 brought a unified view of military and civil defence, a 
new concept as explained below. Total Defence was a concept established in this defence policy cov-
ering the entire population with a strategic plan consisting of military defence, civil defence, econom-
ic defence and psychological defence (Defence Resolution 1997-2001). It is not unusual that Swedish 
military installations have a small town dug into the rock of an island, with offices, hospital,  restau-
rants,  police,  fire department,  and repair shops. The Swedish Government, in dealing with the psy-
chological defence, conducted frequent surveys to gauge attitudes in society regarding defence, with 
results showing 80% or more of the population supporting that Sweden should offer resistance in case 
of an attack, even though the final outcome is uncertain.  
 With respect to civil defence,  the country can hold more than five million people in refugee 
camps with anti-gas masks fully supplied. According to the Total Defence policy every Swedish citi-
zen between 16 and 65 years of age can be recruited to civil defence service,  and in case of war,  
more than 200,000 Swedes can be part of a civil defence effort.  Economic defence, according to this 
resolution, implies readiness with large stock of fabrics for blankets and warm clothes,  semi-finished 
products and raw materials for textile industry; salt and coal mines in the abandoned caves; oil in 
underground tunnels. More than 20,000 companies are essential in a war effort and the government 
requested emergency response plans to each one of them. The Defence Resolution for 1997-2001 
stated that a democratic defence system of a nation “should be the concern and responsibility of the 
entire population” and that Sweden´ s modern Total Defence would create “strength and will to re-
sist” that paid professionals only could not have (Defence Resolution 1996-2001: 15-16).  Hence, it 
has been crucial the participation of Swedish population in the construction and organization of Total 
Defence.  This broader definition includes prevention of emergencies and increased participation in 
international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian actions.  
                                                 
4 Personal interview by author,  19 December, 2012,  Stockholm.   
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Figure 3 - Total Defence Concept as formulated by the Swedish Government 
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The diagram above represents a summary of the evolution of the concept of total defence as a 
new concept for the security of a society and crisis management in the twenty-first century, according 
to Michael Mohr, who was secretary of the Defence Commission in the Swedish Parliament at the 
time of this policy formulation. The purpose of this coordinated security strategy is to structure the 
visions of threats and Sweden´ s security objectives. It also involved the managing of resources, ac-
tors and methods for effective and rational use for the prevention of all types of national or interna-
tional threats.  
The Reinfeldt Government (Moderate) inherits,  from 2006 on, the previously Social-
Democratic determined policy in 2004 - Our Future Defence - where the priority was still "help man-
age and prevent crises in the immediate vicinity", that is,  in the Baltic region and in the Northwestern 
Europe. At the same time, policies proposed increased military capacities to defend the territory from 
armed attacks and to protect civilians, safeguarding the most important functions of society in the 
event of a war (Our Future Defence 2004: 10).  In so doing, Sweden implemented its most rooted 
traditions of a small country that wants to keep their autonomy and sovereignty.  
 In general,  the debate between the Red Left and the Gray Left5 inside the Social Democratic 
Party (S) reflects,  up to today, the divide between those who give more priority to education, health 
and housing, and those who are pro-industry jobs and profits,  including the defence area. Håkan 
Juholt,  Social-Democracy leader between 2010 and 2011, sought to write and speak on the issues that 
united the party, forging a new defence policy. Stefan Löfven, Social-Democracy leader (in opposi-
tion until 2014) and Prime Minister from October 2014,  has his life linked to the Union METALL 
(Swedish Metalworkers'  Union). Löfven worked in Häggslunds company producing military vehi-
cles, tanks and large transmission systems in the north of the country, thus becoming an important 
union and political leader,  very active in the defence field.  Now, as a Prime Minister,  he is signing,  
among other things, the implementation of the important Sweden-Brazil Agreements on Fighter 
Combat Airplane, JAS Gripen NG Brazil to be built between the two countries and companies in-
volved.  
  
2.2.2. Participation in Peace Missions 
Sweden sent troops to peacekeeping missions in the Balkans together with NATO in the Part-
nership for Peace (PfP) and performs various international cooperation activities in research and 
training (Crisis Management) at first bilaterally in the Baltic countries (Estonia,  Lithuania and Latvia) 
even having a smaller budget to deal with.  After Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, the 
                                                 
5 Ideological divide inside Social-Democratic Party indicating more support to social policies or more support to labor and industrial capital.  
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training and research programs were carried out under the umbrella of European Union (EU) and 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to countries recently incorporated by the organiza-
tion.6 
The Swedish Government has also engaged in greater international cooperation, even without 
belonging to NATO, by increasing in over five months the conscript training time to include interna-
tional operations. Other proposals and actions taken were the improved recruitment and employment 
of a 750-1000 soldiers battalion in Afghanistan, and, at the same time, a "downsizing” 7 of 25% in the 
number of military soldiers and to reduce by half number of officers,  totalling no more than 2,500 
(Our Future Defence 2004: 15-16).  
 
3. Defense policy and security: new initiatives post-cold war.  
Before the end of the Cold War Sweden´ s foreign, defence and security policies were marked 
by two overriding characteristics.  The first,  a small state realistic policy where the issue of "national 
survival" and the concept of sovereignty are paramount. Included in this overriding policy are neu-
trality and the presence of a powerful army of conscripts to defend the territory, in addition to a 
strong, independent high-tech arms industry. The second feature,  embodied by the typical Swedish 
concept of "doing good", was an adherence to liberal internationalism to defend human rights,  and 
press for freedom and democracy8 (Aggestam 2007).  
While in the middle of the Cold War Northwestern Europe had been a strategic area in the 
balance of power between the US (United States) and the former USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics),  military non-alignment of Sweden (and Finland) was critical to increase stability and 
mutual trust between the two power blocs. Being outside NATO, Sweden was concurrently prevented 
to be a full member of the so-called European Community. But the Swedish policy of security coop-
eration was exercised mainly through the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (organ-
ization established in 1973, governed by the 1975 Helsinki Agreement),  signed by 35 European coun-
tries (except Albania),  by the US, and the former USSR, which allowed Sweden to perform external 
actions of security policy and cooperation on disarmament and arms control,  human rights,  freedom 
of the press and free elections.  
 This explains in part why the transfer of support for NATO and the European Union after 
the end of the Cold War took place without any major controversies with big European powers, Brit-
ain and France. Only after the end of the Cold War, Sweden joined the European Union, but has not 
yet adopted the Euro as its currency. Of the Nordic bloc only Finland has adopted that currency in 
2002. 
 
3.1. Relations with NATO and the European Union after the Cold War: Euroepeinization of Swe-
den and the Common Defence Policy 
3.1.1. Sweden and Cooperative Security and Common Defence Policy.  The Summits on Security and 
Defence and Sweden´ s role.  Crismart 
 
The entry of Sweden in the European Union (EU) in 1995 led to series of initiatives which 
demonstrated that Sweden was not a "free-rider"9 in Europe: it actively participated with troops in the 
Balkan War (Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina).  It also started to export to Europe the complete Crisis 
Management Research and Training system developed by the National Centre for Crisis Management 
Research and Training of the Swedish National Defence College (now Swedish Defence University),  
together with Uppsala University (Stern and Sundelius 2002, 1998).  
Crisis Management,  one of the main sectors of Sweden' s performance in this period, is a cog-
nitive-institutional strategy to contextually analyze the process of crisis,  "where it facilitates recon-
struction, dissection and analysis of specific crises cases." (Stern and Sundelius, 2002: 72).   Crisis 
                                                 
6 All 42 volumes of CRISMART Series published by the Center Crisis Management Research and Training of the Förswarshögskolan (Swedish 
Defence University) are available at the site http://www.fhs.se/en/research-centres-and-programmes/crismart/articles/crismart-series2/#content 
7 “Downsizing” means decreasing the size of effective soldiers in the Swedish Armed Forces.  
8 Sweden was considered a “humanitarian giant” having received several thousand refugees from the Southern Cone military regimes during the 
1970s, particularly from Chile. More than 67.000 from ex-Yugoslavia, 59.0000 from Bosnia-Herzegovina and 50.000 Kurds (Iran, Syria,  
Turkey, and Armenia) are examples of political asylum provided by Sweden in that period.   
9 “Free rider”,  term originated from Mancur Olson (The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965/1971,  
2002 (20th printing), means receiving benefits from a policy without paying for its costs.  
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Management deals with new threats intrinsic to the transnational social,  economic, political,  ecologi-
cal and technological processes arising during the post-Cold War period. To illustrate,  the Europe 
emerging from Soviet Union collapse faced several challenges and contingencies: 
"epidemics, terrorism (kidnappings, plane hijackings, bombings),  ethnic conflict,  
nuclear accidents,  aircraft accidents,  political murders,  floods, large-scale fires, en-
vironmental contamination, and political scandals." (Stern and Sundelius 2002: 72).   
This research and training programme Crisis Management Research and Training 
(CRISMART) initially focused in the Baltic countries, but has widened its focus throughout Southeast 
Europe and the Balkans.  New contingencies required decision-making capabilities and coordination 
actions (communication among actors at different national or local administrative levels),  which were 
non-existent and/or not observed by Swedish researchers.  CRISMART tried to emphasize public 
managers training to provide effective responses to the crises described above.  
Over one hundred cases were analyzed by CRISMART in more than a dozen European coun-
tries, including Sweden' s cooperation with international or regional organizations and the European 
Union training programs covering five major objectives: 
1. Develop analytical tools to study and learn from the concrete crises experiences 
2. Promote the development of crises studies as knowledge able to improve crisis management 
capacity in Sweden and other countries 
3. Encourage academics and administrators of the new European democracies and  vulnerable 
(particularly the Baltic Sea) to document, analyze, compare and share knowledge from 
their crises experiences 
4. To promote national and transnational dialogue between academic communities and crisis 
managers in Europe for training and workshops and thematic conferences 
5. To promote the building of trust and develop policy / operational cooperation capacity 
among governments and international organizations in the region. 10 
The Swedish initiative to export this defence tool to the Baltic republics was meant to strength-
en the civil institutions of Estonia,  Lithuania and Latvia and improve relations between society and 
post-Soviet democratic governments.  It was not enough for these republics joining NATO, it was 
necessary that the environment of the Baltic contained a new regional security. With Sweden funded 
research and training, students,  academics, professionals and local government officials carried out 
case studies analyses in each country. The knowledge generated remained in the countries with the 
education and training of a whole generation of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. In Tallinn,  
Estonia,  the training took place directly with the National Security Coordinator.  Positions in the of-
fices of the prime ministers of these countries were occupied by young adults of 20-25 years of age, 
after three years of training.  
Sweden was invited by the EU to expand the Crisis Management program to be able to apply 
it in cases of Poland and Russia,  involving far more extensive and complex aspects.  In the case of 
Russia,  the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 11 was responsible for research and training. The 
gateway to this country was through the Minister of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Natural Disas-
ters (EMERCON), Sergey Shoigu (1991-2012). The situations of Chernobyl (1986), the Kursk sub-
marine (2000), the earthquake in Neftegorsk (1995), and the Karabash ecological disaster were stud-
ied and thoroughly analysed to define the decision-making process of crisis management12 (Porfiriev 
and Svedin 2002).  
Furthermore, a new contract with the United Nations Development Programme took Crisis 
Management to Southeast European countries (Romania, Bulgaria,  Albania,  Slovenia) with the same 
goal of training staff for the new post-Soviet governments focusing on analysis and crisis resolution in 
civil defence emergencies of the populations, but without the same previous results of the Baltic re-
publics.13  
                                                 
10 The Center of Crisis Management Research and Training of the Swedish Defence University offers courses in:  a) International Crisis Mana-
gement; b) Senior Course in Crisis Management and Civil emergency Planning; c) Senior Course in Security Policy of New Europe. Research 
reports are available at http://www.fhs.se/en/research/research-centres-and-programmes/crismart/about/ 
11 MSB - Myndigheten för samhällskydd och beredskap is its Swedish name. It was created in 2009 reorganizing three different agencies dealing 
with issues of homeland security.  
12 Kursk, a nuclear submarine of the Russian Navy, sank at the Barents Sea in 12 August 2000. Subsequent investigations have shown that the 
submarine had two explosions, which killed all 118 people onboard. At the moment of the accident it carried no nuclear weapons. Karabash is 
recognized by UNESCO as one of the most polluted places in the world. Located in the Urals, this Russian industrial city had gold and copper 
mining cycles, joined by large scale smelting without any environmental provision.  It became a huge ecological disaster in recent decades.  
13 Personal interview by author,  10 December, 2012,  Stockholm.  
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With respect to Common Defence and Security Policy it is important to observe that the con-
cept of Europeanization was a process of mutual interaction between internal individual country’s 
policies and European public policies at large. According to Wong,  the downloading of EU policies 
that affect the politics,  economics, and society of Sweden was called "Brusselisation",  i.e.  the con-
vergence of domestic policies with those of Brussels (Wong 2005: 145, apud Lee-Ohlsson 2009: 
125). Because it is a mutual process, it is an uploading process of internal policies of states to the 
EU, making them protagonists in the actions and policy practices (Wong 2005: 137, apud Lee-
Ohlsson 2009: 125).  
This does not occur unreluctantly. For example, the Swedish Prime Minister,  Göran Persson 
(S) was critical when he pronounced to the Riksdag that the objectives of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) were only the detection and deactivation of “mines in Bosnia and training of 
border guards in Macedonia and police officers in Albania.” (see Lee-Ohlsson 2009: 128) 
In other words, the Prime Minister criticized the ESDP in the sense that Sweden could offer 
innovative proposals to Europe. It must be remembered that Persson’s Social-Democratic Govern-
ment depended notwithstandingly on the support in Parliament of two Eurosceptic parties (Green 
Party and Left Party) and contained internal divisions over the ESDP and the EU in general.  
From the Helsinki European Council (December 1999) on, Sweden becomes more involved in 
European defence and security matters,  what signifies the importance of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). It was the Swedish tradition of prioritizing and promoting the Civilian Crisis 
Management that made Sweden notable.  With the Swedish Presidency of the EU in the first half of 
2001, impetus was given to Civilian Crisis Management.  With this policy many diplomatic successes 
ensued, up to the point that even the actual military issues were widely discussed at the Gothenburg 
Meeting of the European Council (June 2001) still under the Swedish Presidency, where issues of 
conflict prevention and militarization of the ESDP were agreed upon. 14 
The ESDP consolidation came about with the creation of the European Defence Agency in 
2003 capping a sequence of actions in which Sweden actively participated in the period 2001-2004, 
namely: 
 
-  Military Operation of the European Union – Implementation of Ohrid Peace Agreement – 
CONCORDIA/FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).  March 2003.  
- Operation Concordia (January 2003) - first joint military operation of the ESDP; the EU re-
places NATO; Sweden also participated in the Berlin Plus - the Stabilization Plan of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 2004 
- NATO - Partnership for Peace (PfP) in Afghanistan with 500 soldiers,  together with the US 
army 
- MONUC - UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (2004); Sweden sent 90 to the 
military air base 
- Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  First use of troops outside the EU 
zone with France / EU 
- Operation UNMIL - Liberia - had 240 Swedish soldiers in mechanized rifle company.  
 
These were significant results which fuelled Sweden’s greater influence in the EU, not just in 
the European Security and Defence Policy but also in the wider pillar of the European Union, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).15 
The armed forces of Sweden became proactive in EU military operations and have been cru-
cial in creating the European Union Battalion Group (EUBG), with 1,500 soldiers set up as a rapid 
reaction force together with Finland,  following France and the UK, which caused a real reform in the 
Swedish Armed Forces after the end of the Cold War.  
The civil dimension was the largest Swedish contribution to the European Security and De-
fence Policy (ESDP) shaping and influencing it with traditional Swedish thinking on foreign policy 
and security, while internally the Eurosceptic parties,  the Parliament as a whole, and the Swedish 
government have adapted to the ESDP. Internal changes in the Swedish Security Policy by "down-
                                                 
14 Personal interview by author,  17 December, 2012,  Swedish Riksdag, Stockholm. 
15 During this period Sweden was governed by the Social-Democratic Party (S) having as prime-minister Göran Persson, who chose Björn von 
Sydow (1997-2002) and Leni Björklund (2002-2006) as ministers of Defence. Von Sydow became Speaker of the Riksdag (president of the 
Swedish Parliament),  between 2002 and 2006.  
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loading" were due to the fact of fully belonging to the EU and less as consequence from the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).   
Membership of the European Security and Defence Policy constituted the biggest change in 
500 years of Sweden’s Armed Forces, serving as an important tool to process reforms in national 
defence, as an adaptation and convergence of European public policy into Sweden.  
But also Sweden influenced significantly the European Security and Defence Policy by "up-
loading" its own characteristics and policies. Sweden contributed 7.1% of the personnel involved in 
the operations of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the fifth largest supplier of 
staff.  It had a clear influence on the civil dimension where a mix of civilian and military operations 
defined as considerably important by the Swedish government for the country participation in the 
ESDP. Today,  Sweden is considered one of the European powers next to Germany, Britain, France 
and Italy, particularly in the policy-making process of the Council of Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), the highest body of the European Union. Corroborating this view, Sweden in 2015 competes 
with Italy for a place in the UN Security Council (non-permanent members) for the 2017-18 period. 16 
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) also lends itself as a platform for the Swe-
dish and European foreign policy - an independent and active foreign policy, with a long tradition of 
participation in UN peace maintenance operations, which facilitated its entrance on ESDP and UN 
operations. It has been proven that UN and NATO interventions in the Balkans were not the best way 
to deal with this conflict.  The ESDP, with a strong Swedish influence in crisis management,  proved 
more appropriate especially where there is involvement of an unprotected civilian population (Von 
Sydow 2000).  
 
3.2. New Global Issues: terrorism and immigration 
3.2.1. Terrorism and Sweden 
Sweden does not have a war in its territory for over 200 years.  During the Cold War period 
terrorism only sporadically occurred: the assassination of the Yugoslav ambassador Vladimir 
Rolović,  in 1971, by Croatian National Resistance; the street murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme 
in 1986, and the deadly stabbing of Foreign Relations minister,  Anna Lindh, in 2003.  Following 
9/11/2001 attacks on New York World Trade Center,  and the killing of Anna Lindh Sweden´ s stance 
on counterterrorism changed.   
Sweden couterterrorism policies interact with other priorities,  policies, and programmes within 
governmental actions. Perception of real threats and institutional reorganizations affect policies and 
programmes governance at the national and at the international level.  As such, the international ter-
rorist events during the years 2000s played an important role in counterterrorism policy changes in 
Sweden. They represented a convergence towards European Union and United Nations acts,  resolu-
tions, declarations, strategies,  as shown by Strandh and Eklund (2015) and summarized below.   
                                                 
16 Personal interview by author,  24 February, 2015, Stockholm.  
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Figure 4. A Selection of International Events and policies,  laws, institutional changes in Sweden, 
since 2001 
 International Events New policies and institutions affecting 
Sweden 
2001 11 September attacks at WTC, Pentagon in the US .UNSC Resolution 137  
.UN Resolution 1269 combating interna-
tional terrorism 
.UN convention of suppression of financ-
ing of terrorism 
2004 
2005 
Terrorist attacks in Madrid 
Terrorist attacks in London 
Decentralization and radicalization of Islamic circles in 
Europe and Sweden 
.European Declaration on combating 
Terrorism 
.EU-Counterterrorism Strategy 
.First meeting of the Swedish Counterter-
rorism Co-operative Council 
2007 Lars Vilks´ s “Muhammad drawings” published, pro-
tests 
.A National Strategy for Combating 
Counterterrosim (Skr 2007/08:64) 
2009 Swedish EU presidency . The National Centre for the Assessment 
of Terrorist Threats 
.  Act on Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing (2009:62) 
.  Establishing the Swedish Civil Contin-
gencies Agency replacing Rescue Ser-
vices, Emergency Management and the 
National Board of Psychological Defence 
in Sweden.  
Source: Summarized and adapted by author from Strandh and Eklund (2015: 365).  
 
The establishment of new cooperative arrangements with European initiatives on counterter-
rorism set the tone on Sweden´ s massive commitment to international initiatives against terrorism, 
particularly after 2005, when greater emphasis on the interaction between mitigation and prevention 
was present.   
Following the Swedish tradition of small ministries with several agencies, the country created 
a complex arrangement of 14 different agencies interrelated to the Sweden Security Service dealing 
with terrorism prevention and mitigation, observing a multi-level governance at the internal,  regional 
(EU) and international (UN) levels, multi-sectoral activities and multi-sites (land borders,  sea bor-
ders,  airports,  ports,  business concerns, infra-structure,  etc).  
During the two decades of post-Cold War the concept of security was gradually increased 
from purely military matters to international conflicts: terrorism, endemic social issues (hunger),  and 
even climate change have become a matter of international security. However, in recent years there 
has been return to the original bed where security issues are more related to military conflicts and 
development (Ashton 2010).  
 In this sense it is good to remember the two main security priorities of Sweden: 
 
a) HOMELAND SECURITY 
a.1 - defence of the national territory - Cold War / 300 years of wars with Denmark, Finland,  
Norway and Russia 
- The Nordic countries are now friendly countries 
- Ceased the threat of the former Soviet Union after 1991: "a strategic timeout", ac-
cording to Björn von Sydow 
a.2 - Corporate Safety, same concept of "homeland security" adopted in the US 
 - The Swedish Society has to work 
 - Functional safety of society has to operate even with difficulties 
a.3 - Back in 2013,  the traditional concept of territorial defence with Putin advances in the 
Baltic Sea and the Arctic,  in combination with the reactivation of the military industrial 
complex in Russia.  
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b) PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS UNITED NATIONS 
b.1 - "Peace enforcing" UN-EU Democratic Republic of Congo 
b.2 - Since 2006 --with a very high priority-- Sweden maintains a presence of 500 soldiers in 
Afghanistan at a cost of one million Swedish Kronor per year per soldier =  500 million 
SEK / year (US$ 85 million annually). 17 
 
3.2.2.  Immigration Issues: Sweden absorption of refugees, 1995-2010  
Sweden has been a champion on humanitarian, altruistic,  and democratic policies to refugees 
and immigrants in general.  Thousands of political refugees from South American military regimes,  
Middle East,  Former Yugoslavian Republic,  and African countries have sought asylum in Sweden,  
which also received a large economic migration.  Recently,  between 2008-2014, Sweden absorbed 5% 
of illegal immigrants to Europe, as shown in in a study with data collected on National shares appre-
hensions of illegal immigrants in the period done by Eurostat (Figure 5, Orrenius and Zavordny 
2016:6 ).   
While the destination of unauthorized immigrants was low in Scandinavian countries, Germa-
ny, France and Sweden concentrated 53% of all asylum applications to European countries. Sweden 
alone received a 12% share of EU asylum applicants in that same 2008-2014 period. This is a reflec-
tion of strong economy with low unemployment rates,  generosity of asylum and welfare policies to 
economic migrant of the past decades (Figure 6, Orrenius and Zavordny 2016: 6 ff).  
The same authors state that Sweden is one of the most permissive state on less-skilled econom-
ic migrants following a 2008 reform which allowed third country labor migration for the first time in 
decades. However, Sweden imposes severe restrictions on irregular immigrants once asylum is 
barred, limiting severely their access to the welfare and public services system (Orrenius and 
Zavordny 2016: 8-11).  
The most recent developments will be presented in a subsequent section (4.1).   
 
3.3. Industrial Relations with NATO and the European Union  
3.3.1. On Defence industry and markets.  Industrial and technological cooperation policy.  Offsets and 
cooperation 
At the end of the 1990s and early 2000s began a period of strong international cooperation 
when a Framework Agreement Concerning Measures for Facilitating the Restructuring and Operation 
of the European Defence Industry was signed by six members that comprise 90% of the production of 
armaments in Europe: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 18 It should 
be noted that the process of integration in this policy area occurred between governments,  not supra-
nationally. A number of recommendations from the European Parliament and from the European 
Commission were made towards the creation of a market for the production and trade of weapons, to 
increase research and facilitating legally EU member states on military acquisitions. This liberaliza-
tion was intended to promote cooperation between several European countries to increase the econo-
my and trade of the defence industries.  (Britz 2010: 178) 
But it was only with the establishment of the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) 
and the decision to create the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2003/2004 that advances were 
made towards the European defence market.  Nevertheless,  member states have only partially used 
defence procurement on an internal European market,  in view of the reliance on Article 346 TFEU 
(old 296 of the Treaty) establishing the European Community to make the majority of their purchases 
on a national basis.  The “birth of an European market for defence equipment” only occurred with the 
signing of a Code of Conduct for the Trans-Border Competition in the Market of Defence Equipment 
in 2005. 19 The Code made possible more efficient military procurement and promoted research and 
development of joint projects and innovative technologies,  as well as structuring investment mecha-
nisms for joint ventures. (Britz 2010: 180).   
                                                 
17 Personal interview by author,  9 January, 2013, Swedish Riksdag, Stockholm.  
18 Signing this Agreement was due to the lack of action on the part of the WEU (Western European Union) and of the WEAG (Western Euro-
pean Armaments Group). Also the ad hoc POLARM Working Group of the EU was little effective in actions.  
19 Personal interview by author,  27 January,  2013,  Stockholm.  
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Even with this institutional instrument at hand it was essential to maintain a strong Defence 
Technology and Industrial Base (DTIB) at the European level in view of the diminishing budgets at 
the national level to keep technological advance, exports competing in international markets,  and 
thousands of specialized employment positions in most European countries.  The member-states De-
fence Ministers agreed in 2007 that an European Defence Technology and Industrial Base should 
include:  
- Capability driven Industry – supplying what the military asks for,  while sustaining European 
and national operational sovereignty  
- Competent - rapid exploitation of best technologies, second best is not enough in combat 
equipment 
- Competitive – what is produced must be affordable in Europe and abroad.  (EDA 2007:2) 
 
Defence industries are typically dependent on government investments,  acquisitions and regu-
lations. In this sense the tools agreed in Brussels were keen in shaping the future years to come on 
European defence industry and dealt with: 
- Establishment of clear priorities by Armed forces and Defence Ministries on their future mil-
itary capability needs, including shared programmes and collaborative matches 
- Investment in research and development – ”spend more, better and spend more together on 
Defence Reseach and Technology” (Defence ministers Steering Board, Brussels, 2006)  
- Cooperation – collaborative R&D and armaments programmes to increase mutual assurance 
of supply  
- Competition - (considering article of the Treaty to protect national security interests) (EDA 
2007: 3 ff) 
 
Another important issue regarding European defence industry and markets is related to offsets.  
Some EU members required that defence imports be accompanied by compensations in purchases or 
investment to provide infant industries to acquire know how and know why thus being capable of 
successfully competing on international markets. An analysis done by the Swedish Defence Research 
Agency (FOI) stated: 
 
In brief, it is indicated that the companies receiving offsets deals containing substantial technology de-
velopment are more successful on the international market than companies receiving manufacturing off-
set deals.  (Eriksson, 2007: 59) 
  
According to the research, the Member States “are becoming ´ more European´  in their de-
fence trading patterns.” (Eriksson 2007:3).  But considering approximately € 200 billion of defence 
expenditures in Europe, in 2007, still only around 2% would be the result of offset agreements,  i.  e. ,  
an offset volume of € 5.6 billion,  distributed 40% to direct military offset,  40% indirect military 
offset,  and 20% indirect civil offset.  (Eriksson 2007:4)  
Out of this study of offset and defence related trading patterns it is important to highlight three 
major findings by Eriksson and his associates: 
 
- France e Germany do not accept offset. . .  their export is globally oriented and imports in-
creasingly European.  
- Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and UK is a group of net exporter with considerable import.  
As a group their import patterns have a strong transatlantic orientation while,  in contrast,  
their export has a strong European tendency. Indirect military offset is their typical form of 
offset.  This indicates a striving for defence industry specialization and a pattern of mutual in-
terdependencies, perhaps, however, more in a transatlantic context than a European one.   
- Finland, Greece,  Poland, Portugal,  and Spain are the big European defence equipment im-
porters.  Some are also significant exporters.  Their offset seems to be direct to a high degree.  
This may indicate some risk for duplication. (Eriksson 2007:77) 
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According to Ulf Hammarström20,  after a decade of activities on the European defence 
industry is still dominantely national markets,  which in general have been shrinking,  although 
showing an upsurge in recent years.  A major achievement was the launching of Electronic Bulletin 
Board operated by EDA which displays contract related to the Intergovernmental Regime on Defence 
procurement, to enhance cross-border competition of sensitive items covered by Article 346 TFEU 
(Treaty on the Functioning of European Union).    
On the other hand major defence industries are looking globally for partnerships and sales 
rather than consolidating an internal or a regional European markets.  It so happened with France and 
Brazil in the Submarine Development Programme (PROSUB) involving the construction and 
development of four conventional submarines and a nuclear propelled submarine with a Brazilian 
Navy-developed nuclear power plant.  With the recent changes, SAAB, which sold 70% of its revenue 
in the domestic market in 2002, started to have 60% of its sales revenue in international markets in 
2011. As a result of this policy, a cooperation and development of military fighters contract with 
Brazil,  the FX2 Gripen NGBR SAAB-Embraer programme, has become one of the most ambitious 
development programme sought after by the Swedish Government, being this project a major strate-
gic partnership, with large technology transfer (Hammarström 2016) .  
3.4. The concept of neutrality unveiled.   
The tradition of Swedish neutrality in defence and security policies arises from the fact that it 
lost a large part of its territory during the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century. Including,  
Sweden lost Finland to Russia,  which was established as an autonomous region in 1809. Since 1812 - 
with the establishment of the current Bernadotte dynasty-- Sweden has adopted a policy of not taking 
initiative in wars, until more recently where Sweden actively operates in peace keeping missions and 
crisis management programs in Kosovo, Congo and Afghanistan. With the entry into the EU, ap-
proved by a referendum in 1995, the principle of neutrality was impaired, but not abolished.  
However, this Stockholm and Helsinki Cold War neutrality should be critically evaluated. It 
was not as great as it was touted to be. Sweden and Finland were neutral.  Although professing non-
alignment and criticizing openly Washington for the war in Vietnam, Sweden was formally, along 
with Finland (this informally),  secretly allied with NATO, with secret agreements often through other 
Scandinavian countries members of NATO - Denmark, Norway and Iceland. As the coast of the 
Soviet Union (Kaliningrad enclave)-Lithuania was only 100 km of the islands of Gotland and Fårö, 21 
the threat was face-to-face. Hence the secret alliance, wrote Mikael Holmström (2012), a correspond-
ent on defence and security for the Svenska Dagbladet. 22 
Despite neutrality not originating from a treaty or a formal legal document that instituted it,  it 
embodies a declared Sweden’s ambition to be not aligned in peace and neutral in the case of war.  23 
Notwithstanding, Sweden did not stop producing fighter jets,  tanks and submarines developing even 
more its defence industry, particularly during the Cold War.  
This concept was then gradually transformed into non-alignment and freedom to engage or not 
in war. In 2004 Sweden transformed its defence of protection against invasions to a "mobile defence,  
operationally flexible " (Our Future Defence 2004: 5),  and soon after passed in Parliament the pro-
posal of international participation in the Nordic Battle Group reinforcing the European Policy De-
fence and Security. The Chief of Staff of the Swedish Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Mats Nils-
son, stated that from 2007 the Swedish forces were present on three continents in UN, EU and 
NATO international operations. This and other actions between 2001 and 2004 mentioned above 
clearly show the gradual inclination of the Swedish political elite and decision-makers for a conceptu-
al shift from neutrality to greater cooperation with international military forces (Basset,  2012, p. 46).  
The minister of Foreign Relations, Carl Bildt,  in his first speech to Parliament clearly admits that ". . .  
Sweden broke with a tradition [of neutrality] that originated in 1812." (Bildt 2007) In opinion polls 
made shortly after,  52% of Swedes saw as positive for the country’s safety to join the European Un-
ion; fifty-two percent also saw the Swedish participation in the Common Foreign Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the EU as positive for the Sweden security, and 49% approved the Swedish missions in the 
European Security and Defence Policy (SIPRI 2010). This also shows a gradual change in Swedish 
society regarding neutrality and involvement with the European Union in international security activi-
ties.  
                                                 
20 Personal interview by the author, 19 October 2016, Niterói.  
21 Island where famous filmmaker Ingmar Bergman lived and filmed part of his movies.  
22 Personal interviews by author, 19 December, 2012,  10 January,  2013, and 9 January, 2013.  
23 Even if neutrality were a principle for Swedish defence and security, for all effects during World War II Sweden surreptitiously provided 
iron-ore to Nazi Germany through occupied Norway. At the same time, Sweden received 8,000 Jews and hundreds of anti-fascist activists from 
Denmark and Norway occupied by the Nazi regime, placing them under the protection of churches and Christian families during the war.  
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4.  New challenges of defence policy and swedish international cooperation in defence and 
security.  
4.1. Shifts on recent migration policies  
In the past four years 2012-2014 Sweden has granted 31.771 asylum applications to Syrians 
alone. (Ostrand, 2015, p 270) There was a significant upsurge in immigration and asylum seekers in 
the recent years --160.000 in 2015, and expecting another 150.000 in 2016--,  what poses a challenge 
in view of the changing “political,  cultural and social environment in which there is no place for 
political naivety and ideological blindness” (Gholam Ali Pour 2016).  
Notwithstanding reports showing important revenues increases caused by consumption by ref-
ugees and thousands of small business established by immigrants in Sweden,  adequate responses are 
yet to be found by politicians, and society at large. On the other hand, Eger studied the effects of 
immigration and ethnic heterogeneity in Sweden on support for the welfare state,  showing a gradual 
erosion of public support for universal spending on social welfare (Eger 2010).  This is corroborated 
by the fact that Sweden accepts more refugees relative to its small population (9.5 million, 32.000 
asylum granted in 2012-2015, 1.5 million non-Swedes) than any other country, and does a competent 
service of providing protection, but their integration into Swedish schools,  housing system and 
healthcare is hesitant,  as Lifvendahl (2016) points out.  
Sweden´ s tradition of rule of democracy and justice should hold strong against shifts in the po-
litical parties and political groups requiring severe restrictions on immigration and refugees, even 
requiring turning thousands of them back out of Sweden.    
 
4.2. Sweden-Finland and Baltic Sea cooperation in new times 
In front of new security and defence challenges, Sweden finds itself facing the options of 
maintaining the rule of non-aligned status and concomitantly increase its defence spending or to join 
NATO. Even with other options, like deepening Nordic cooperation or even an expansion of the 
Sweden-Finland military cooperation towards a full military alliance, this is part of a general assess-
ment presented by the Defence ministers of Sweden and Finland in May 2014, and of the public de-
bate about the challenges in the Baltic and Arctic new geopolitical environment.  
Finland and Sweden, already partners in bi-lateral defence cooperation and in multilateral or-
ganizations - NORDIC Defence Cooperation (NOREFCO), European Union, NATO and UN - ,  are 
seeking to avoid redundancies in their forces and increased communication between ministries of 
Defence and greater coordination between their Armed Forces. While the Navy and the Air Force of 
the two countries work towards greater long-term planning, with a common set of infrastructure and 
combined equipment units,  interoperability and operational control transfer of units,  the Swedish and 
Finnish Land Forces focus in common exercises, training and education of the troops (Final Report 
2014).  
 
4.3. Sweden-Russia relations since 2011.  
The new strategic and geopolitical picture in the Baltic Sea region and in Northwestern Europe 
after 2013 put forward an end of the "strategic timeout" of the post-Cold War period, according to 
von Sydow (2013). International geopolitical conditions - where excel the annexation of Crimea and 
the Ukraine crisis - indicate the possibility of use of force in the Nordic region. During the Cold 
War, Sweden and Finland served as a shield of neutrality between the former USSR and NATO. 
Now, conflicts and crises in Eastern Europe can directly and indirectly affect those countries and can 
potentially lead to armed conflict in Northern Europe. Russia and Sweden relations have been marked 
by wars and conflicts,  historically. When Russia acted upon the Ukraine crisis with the annexation of 
Crimea peninsula where a majority of Russians lived, Sweden followed European Union and United 
States sanctions and all but froze commercial relations with Russia causing a 45% drop on trade be-
tween the two countries. Diplomatic relations between Sweden and Russia have cooled off after a 
decade of increased investment and trade.   
Russia is the geopolitical dominant power of Northern Europe, and as such economic and mili-
tary interest converge on the Baltic Sea and the Arctic profitable new economic activities of extrac-
tion of energy resources, maritime transport and fishing are a growing reality bringing along many 
uncertainties and challenges. The construction of the Nord Stream pipeline between Russia and Ger-
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many arised ecological,  economic, political,  as well as military challenges. Baltic Sea security vul-
nerabilities were already demonstrated by Larsson (2007), since the pipeline crossed Swedish conti-
nental shell.  It also means by-passing Ukraine on its way to Germany, what signifies loss of revenue 
to that country.   The re-emergence of Russia as a military power -- having gone through a complete 
defence modernization by virtue of the surplus funds raised under an intense exploitation and market-
ing of oil and natural gas to Europe--,  brings new challenges which may lead to the use of force in 
the region. (Gotkowska 2013) 
Similarly, recent events in the Middle East and North Africa indicate shifts in terms of interna-
tional security. All three factors point that additional preparation and operational capability of the 
armed forces is necessary. Geographically, the island of Gotland and the city of Stockholm are two 
key strategic areas that require greater naval presence in the Baltic,  a larger logistics and rapid re-
sponse systems.  
During the preparations for the 2015 Defence Bill the Defence Commission of Swedish Gov-
ernment stated that Russia and Sweden had different views on the Nordic and Baltic Sea security and 
the risk of military incidents were rising: 
The Nordic and Baltic Sea region is characterised overall by stability,  dialogue and coopera-
tion. The policies pursued by Russia,  on the other hand, are unpredictable and destabilising. It is 
inconceivable that a military conflict in our region would affect only one country. A separate military 
attack targeting Sweden remains unlikely. However, crises and incidents – including those involving 
military force – may also occur and in the longer term the threat on military attack can never be ruled 
out.  Russia´ s aggression towards Ukraine demonstrates that the risk of this has increased, also in our 
region” (Sveriges Delegation Nato- Försvarsberedningens rapport,  16 maj 2014) 
Due to this situation, the Defence Commission of the Swedish Government (Regeringkansiliet,  
Summary 2014) recommended increasing air defence military capabilities from 60 to 70 units of the 
new Gripen JAS 39E. The Defence Commission recommended Swedish Navy to operate with more 
units,  thus increasing its defence capacity. As most of the Swedish Army combat forces are made up 
of reservists,  the Defence Commission recommended that two or three battalions combat teams 
should be composed of full soldiers,  professionals,  and recommended organization in brigades (in-
cluding mechanized ones) and intensive training.   
In this new context,  the Swedish defence policy of reduction of the armed forces and lower in-
vestment in military weaponry (seeking new strategic partners such as South Africa,  Brazil and India) 
has become a problem. Having crossed the path from neutrality to non-alignment,  Sweden remains 
free to stay out of military alliances and freely choose its policies during wartime. But with the entry 
into the EU in 1995 and its twin-track integration with the European Defence and Security Policy,  
coupled with the limitations imposed on expenditure on armaments and contingents of the armed 
forces, Sweden is placed at a dangerous crossroads and works a redesign of the defence and security 
policy in the new Social-Democratic government since October 2014.  
Sweden unilaterally declared solidarity with the Nordic countries and the European Union 
since 2009,  which also shows a reverse expectation of solidarity in the event of a natural disaster or 
an armed attack affecting Sweden (according to the EU - Lisbon Treaty, Article 42). 24 This proved to 
be politically and militarily unfeasible to solve the security dilemma of Sweden. Public debates on 
collective defence and mutual assistance stem from the criticism that Sweden may not be able to de-
fend itself in case of a war, even insisting on the status of non-military alignment (Nuelist 2013).  
 
4.4. The future of security and defence in Sweden 
The future of defence and security in Sweden is inextricably connected to multi-lateral cooper-
ation involving UN – regarding global peace and development. Being a full member of EU, Sweden 
cooperates with actions to enhance democratic and peaceful developments in the region, particularly 
in view of current threats.  Under a partial cooperation with NATO Sweden is capable of developing 
military capabilities, as well as contributing to crisis management operations, one of Sweden´ s best 
capacities.   
However, not all is so clear cut.  Russia´ s Foreign minister,  Sergey Lavrov,  recently inter-
viewed in Moscow by Dagen Nyheter reporter,  Michael Winiarski,  stated:  
                                                 
24 Among other things,  Lisbon Treaty introduced: (1) altered the denomination European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); (2) introduced a mutual defence clause; (3) instituted a solidarity clause; (4) increased the scope of mis-
sions; (5) enlargement of the domain of Reinforced Cooperation; (6) creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation; (7) strengthening of the role 
of European Defence Agency,  EDA; and (8) concession of juridical personality to the EU.  
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If Sweden decides to joint Nato, we don’t believe for that matter the Swedes will attack us.  
But since the Swedish military infrastructure in that situation will be subordinate to NATO’s high 
command, naturally we will take necessary technical-military measures at our northern borders,  since 
on the other side there is a military political block that regards Russia as a threat and attempts in 
every way to hold her back… (Q. What concrete measures? ) … That is not my job, it is a matter for 
our military forces, the defence ministry and the Russian general staff.  (2016,  Russia foreign minister 
S. Lavrov interview).  
Recent Swedish reports on security and defence point to a worsening of the Baltic region secu-
rity situation.  All recommendations contained in previous Defence Commission Reports (2014, 2015) 
were reaffirmed in the political agreement regarding defence policies orientations for the future 
signed by Sweden´ s major political parties -- the Social Democrats,  the Green Party, the Moderates,  
Centre Party and Christian Democrats (Försvarspölitisk inriktning 2016 töm 2020, 2015).    
Their recommendations specifically indicate where Sweden can have a important role in coop-
erative agreements at the Baltic and European security concerns: a) a credible defence forces better 
trained, in cooperative bi-lateral (Finland, Poland, Germany), Nordic,  EU arrangements; b) increased 
air defence, terrestrial and naval presence in the Baltic Sea and in the Island of Gotland;  c) planning 
for a new civil defence capability,  including modern psychological warfare defence;  d) enhanced 
cyber capabilities for hybrid threats,  and long distance precision control abilities.  (Försvarspölitisk 
inriktning 2016 töm 2020, 2015) 
5. Final considerations  
This paper analyzed the major challenges to Swedish Defence and Security briefly during the 
Cold War, and in the period after the Cold War. Looking at how different government,  irrespective 
of their ideological stance, have led to foster an independent foreign policy it was shown mechanisms 
and drivers towards an autonomous defence industry, including the dimensions of total national de-
fence and regional and international security cooperation.  Among this,  the crisis management policy 
instrument clearly stands out for its training and management capability building on Eastern European 
countries after the fall of the Soviet Union.  
One of the sectors where foreign policy and defence and security policy intersect is the de-
fence industry. In Sweden, this combination is particularly important because of the indigenous de-
velopment of its defence industry in terms of sophisticated technological autonomy and innovations. 
After the end of the Cold War, Sweden followed major changes in the European defence industry.  
What used to be one closed system per country, State-Industry relations evolved in the direction of a 
European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, which introduced the principle of "marketiza-
tion" (Britz 2010) and of “liberalism” in acquisitions. 25 The General Agreement signed by six coun-
tries comprised 90% of European defence companies, Sweden´ s included. As such,  state-owned 
defence enterprises were able to act as market economy companies enjoying subsidy reduction, de-
regulation, corporate organization, privatization, mergers, takeovers,  etc.  These actions led to a re-
structuring of the European defence industry, which operates in current times in a very different base 
resulting from mergers and acquisitions that took place during the 1990s and 2000s (European De-
fence Agency, 2005). A complex arrangement of government institutions, universities or research 
centres, private companies and research institutes evolved since this restructuring in Sweden towards 
a highly organized defence industry. 26 
Neutrality,  that Sweden adopted from the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vi-
enna in 1815, served to keep the country out of Cold War conflicts.  It also served during the Second 
World War to maintain Swedish territory free of military occupation, even if for two times the King-
dom of Sweden allowed the Nazi army to cross its territory to invade and occupy Norway, particular-
ly Northern Norway where iron ore shipments from Swedish mining towns of Kiruna and Malm-
berget were taken to Narvik, a Northern Norway fjord harbor.  
For many years Sweden has cooperated bilaterally to promote research and training of public 
managers in crisis management in the new republics emerged with the end of Soviet rule in the Baltic 
Sea, in Southeast Europe, Russia and Poland. With the post-Cold War changes and the new post-11 
September, 2001 international context,  Sweden’s position gradually changed. If in the 1990s and 
early twenty-first century the main concern was with the management and resolution of crises of 
different nature resulting from the abrupt changes in the international system.    
                                                 
25 Personal interview by author,  23 January,  2013.  Kista, Sweden.  
26 Personal interviews by author, 11 December, 2012, Stockholm; 11 January, 2013, Stockholm; 18 December, 2012, Bromma, Sweden; 22 
January, 2013; 23 January, 2013, Kista, Sweden.  
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Now, in the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Swedish perception of 
geopolitical changes in the Baltic Sea and Northern Europe indicate the occurrence of possible insta-
bilities and crises on the periphery of NATO and the European Union. Politically, new formats of 
collective action in cooperation for regional security are substantiated in the Northern Group. 27 In the 
military dimension, Sweden seeks to improve interoperability between its Armed Forces and NATO, 
participating in the Rapid Response Force in the Connected Forces Initiative.  The cooperation also 
overlay to energy security and cyber security, as well as the critical infrastructure of the Northern 
Europe region. The adaptation of the Swedish Armed Forces to the international context included a 
new development strategy for future capabilities - the search for strategic partners that contribute to 
the development and implementation of defence and security policies. However, these Swedish ac-
tions may develop into more challenges as Sweden-Russian relations become cooler have not ceased 
to be tense, particularly if Sweden decides to be a full member of NATO.   
All of these actions imply in the transformation of the concept of neutrality into gradual non-
alignment,  but maintaining close cooperation with Armed Forces of multilateral arrangements with 
the UN, NATO, and the Nordic Group, addition to bilateral cooperation with Finland. These are 
uncertainties that translate themselves into a stronger defence.  
But none of these defence and security policy is simple to put into practice.  None of the par-
ties,  Moderate or Social-Democratic,  or the smaller coalition parties,  can implement its defence and 
security policy smoothly. Even developing greater Nordic cooperation and increasing its military 
expenditure,  Sweden probably will not fully engage in NATO. Changes in Sweden' s defence policy 
can bring a strengthening of regional security in the Baltic Sea. Military and political cooperation 
serves as prevention and are presented as deterrence measures, indicating faster and more coordinated 
responses in the event of a crisis,  particularly with Putin' s Russia.  
In conclusion, the party that was in power until 2014 (Moderaterna) is a center-conservative 
party of small and medium traders and liberal businessmen, intellectuals, scientists and engineers 
connected with the private defence industry who understood the need for high level of resources to 
defence. 28 But only with the return of the Social-Democratic party to power the new realities of de-
fence and security, internal and external,  can induce sharper policy design in Sweden.  
6. References  
BOOKS 
Eliasson, Gunnar (2010): Advanced Public Procurement as Industrial Policy: the aircraft industry as technical university. 
Springer. 2010. 311 p.  
Holmström, Mikael (2012): Den dolda alliansen: Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser (The Hidden Alliance: Sweden' s 
Secret Ties to NATO), (Bokförlaget Atlantis, 2012, 656 p).  
Dahl, Ann-Sofie e Pauli Järvenpää (2013): Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a 
post-unipolar world. London and New York: Routledge.  
Porfiriev, Boris and Lina Svedin (2002): Crisis Management in Russia - overcoming institutional rigidity and resource 
constraints. Stockholm: CRISMART-FHS. 
 
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
Aggestam, Lisbeth (2007) : “The European Internationalist: Sweden and European Security Cooperation”, Nação e Defesa 
(Outono-Inverno) 118: 203-218. 
Britz, Malena (2010): “The role of marketization in the Europeanization of the Defence Industrial Policy” : Bulletin of 
Science, Technology and Society 30 (3): 176-184. 
Dijkstra, Hylke (2012): “Agenda-setting in the Common Security and Defence Policy: An institutionalist perspective”. 
Cooperation and Conflict 47: 454-472. 
Eger, Maureen M. (2010): “Even in Sweden: The Effect of Immigration on Support for the Welfare State Spending.”   Eu-
ropean Sociological Review 26 (2): 203-217. DOI:10.1093/esr/jcp017  
Gotkowska, Justyna (2013): “Sitting on the Fence – Swedish Defence Policy and the Baltic Sea Region”. Point of View, 
33 April. Centre for Eastern Studies Warsaw, Poland.  
Longo, Waldimir Pirró e (2007): Tecnologia Militar: conceituação, importância e cerceamento. Tensões Mundiais, 3 (5): 
111-143. 
Nuelist, Christian (2013): The Struggle for Sweden´ s Defence Policy. CSS Analysis in Security Policy, nº  138, July 
(ISSN 2296-0244).  
                                                 
 
27 Created in 2010,  the Northern Group counts with  12 members,  three Nordic countries NATO members (Norway, Denmark, and Iceland),  
two Nordic countries non-NATO member (Sweden and Finland) and seven non-Nordic other countries from the North of Europe, full NATO 
members (United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania). This is a supplement to NATO and the Nordic-
Baltic Security System, including new forms of cooperation among them. (Dahl,  Järvenpää, 2013, p.106)  
28 Personal interview by author,  10 January,  2013.  
Revista de Estudios Europeos,  n. 68, julio-diciembre, 2016                                                                      rEe 
 
92 
 
Orrenius, Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny (2016): “Irregular Immigration in the European Union”. European Policy Analy-
sis, January issue 2016:2,  20 p (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies).   
Ostrand, Nicole. (2015): “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: a comparison of responses by Germany,Sweden, the United King-
dom, and the United States.” Journal of Migration and Human Security, 3 (3): 255-279.  
Schmitter, Philippe (1974): “Still the century of corporatism?”  Review of Politics 36 (1): 85-131.  
Stern, Eric and Bengt Sundelius (2002): “Crisis management in Europe – an integrated regional research and training ap-
proach”.  International Studies Perspectives (3): 71-88.See also, “Crisis Management an Agenda for Research and 
Training”. Cooperation and Conflict 1998. 
Strandh, Veronica and Niklas Eklund. (2015): “Swedish Counterterrorism Policy: an Intersection Between Prevention and 
Mitigation?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 38: 359-379  
Widfeldt, Anders (2008): Sweden - European Journal of Political Research 47: 1143–1147. 
 
RESEARCH REPORTS AND CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
Ashton, Catherine (2010): (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Relations and Security Policy) – For-
eign Affairs- Defence and Development.  Council of  European Union (3055th and 3056th Meetings Report). Brus-
sels, 9 December, 2010.  
Bassett, Bergen (2012): Factors Influencing Sweden’s Changing Stance on Neutrality - Thesis Master of Arts in European 
Union Studies. Graduate College of the University of  Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2012.  
Gholam Ali Pour, Nima: “The Failure of the Swedish Establishment”. Gatestone Institute. International Policy Council. 
May 6, 2016. https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7860/sweden-establishment. Access 28 Oct. 2016.  
Hammarström, Ulf (2016): ”Strategic Partnership Sweden-Brazil.”  Presentation at III EBERI (Annual Meeting of Strate-
gic Studies and International Relations).  17-20 October 2016, University Federal Fluminense, Niterói - Rio de Janei-
ro. 
Mohr, Michael: “Sweden: A New Security Strategy",  in Comprehensive Risk Analysis e Management Network (CRN) - 
CRN WORKSHOP REPORT - Societal  Security and Crisis Management in the 21st Century. Stockholm, 2004, 
Swedish Emergency Management Agency (MSB) and Center for Security Studies ETH Zentrum (SEI)-Zurich, p. 21.   
Noll, Jörg E. (2007): “Leadership and Institutional Reform in Consensual Democracies: Dutch and Swedish”. Defence 
Organizations after the Cold War. Paper to be presented at the ECPR joint sessions of workshops 7-12 May 2007, 
Helsinki. Workshop 5: Political Leadership: A Missing Element in Democratic Theory.  
Stenlås, Niklas (2008): Technology, National Identity and the State: Rise and Decline of a Small State’s Military-Industrial 
Complex. Institute for Future Studies, 2008.  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:7, 31 p.  
 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 
Bildt, Carl - Utrikesdeklarationen 2007: Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, 
Wednesday, 14 February 2007. http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/03/96/05/23e521a9.pdf. (30 November, 
2014).  
Eriksson, E. Anders (2007): Study of the Effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Mar-
ket (E. Anders Eriksson with contributions Mattias Axelson, Keith Hartley, Mike Mason, Ann-Sofie Stenérus and 
Martin Trybus (12 July 2007), FOI SCS Final Report. 164 p. 
European Defence Agency (2005): The Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement of the EU Members States participating 
in the European Defence Agency.  Adopted by the Steering Board on 21 November, 2005. Mimeo.  
European Defence Agency (2007): Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Brussels, 14 
May 2007 
Final Report (2014): on deepened defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden.  Report from the Finnish Ministry of 
Defence and the Swedish Ministry of Defence. 6 May 2014.  
Larsson, Robert L. (2007): Nord Stream, Sweden and Baltic Sea Security. FOI Report 2251 SE.  ISSN 1650-1942, 110 p. 
Lee-Ohlsson, Frederick (2011): “Sweden and Development of the European Security and Defence Policy: A Bi-
Directional Process of Europeanization”. In http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/industry-se.htm.  
Our Future Defence (2004): The focus of Swedish defence policy 2005–2007. Govt Bill 2005/05:5 Regeringskansliet, 
2004. 
Regeringskansliet (2014): Ministry of Defense – The Defence Commission - SUMMARY - The Defence of Sweden - A 
Stronger Defence in Times of Uncertainty (Ds 2014:20). Memorandum , 4 June, 2014.  
Regeringskansliet (2014): Government Offices of Sweden Ministry of Defence –International Defence Cooperation Effi-
ciency, Solidarity, Sovereignty .  Report from the Inquiry on Sweden’s International Defence Cooperation Fö 2013:B , 
2014, p. 22 Table 4.1 
Reinfeld, Fredrik (2012): Government Communication 2011/12:114: Strategic Export Control in 2011 – Military Equip-
ment and Dual-Use Products.  Regeringskansliet - Government Communication to the Riksdag. Stockholm, 15 March, 
2012. PM Fredrik Reinfeld.  
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2010): Swedish EU Presidency and Swedish defence issues. 
Sveriges Delegation Nato.  Försvarsberedningens rapport, 16 maj 2014. Brussels 
The Renewal of Sweden’s Defence: Phase 2. Government Defence Bill 1996/97:4 1996. Unofficial shortened version of 
the Government Defence Bill 1996/97:4 passed by Parliament on 20 November and 13 December, 1996 
Von Sydow, Björn (2000): Sweden´ s Security in the 21st Century. Regeringskansliet – Försvarsdepartamentet (Ministry 
of Defence). 2000. 
 
 
Luiz Pedone: The challenges for Sweden’s defence and security policies: old and new 
 
93 
 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
“Russia issues NATO warning against Sweden.” Interview of Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov Dagens Nyheter. 
Reporter Michael Winiarski. Published 29 April 2016.  
Lifvendahl, Tove. “How Sweden Became an example of how not to handle immigration.” 3 september 2016. 
http://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/09/how-sweden-became-an-example-of-how-not-to-handle-immigration/ access 28 
october 2016 
 
INTERVIEWS: 
Bjorn von Sydow – member of the Swedish Parliament, former minister of Defence, Speaker do Riksdag (Swedish Par-
liament), 2002-2006. 17 December, 2012; 9 January, 2013 
Bengt Sundelius – professor, Swedish Defence University and senior analyst of MSB (Swedish Agency for Homeland Se-
curity). 10 December, 2012; 10 January, 2013 
Eva Söderstrom – SAAB - Industrial Cooperation Division. 18 December, 2012 
Gunnar Hult – chair, Dept Military Studies/ Swedish Defence University. 11 December, 2012; 27 January 2014 
Karin Kronhöffer – analyst and regional director for South America. Swedish Defence and Security Export Agency, FXM. 
11 January, 2013  
Malena Britz – professor, Swedish Defence University. 27 January, 2014.  
Martin Lundmark – senior analyst and vice-director of Research. Swedish Defence. Research Agency– FOI. 23 January, 
2013 
Mattias Axelson – professor, Stockholm School of Economics. 22 January, 2013 
Michael Mohr – Vice-president Public Affairs- SAABGroup, 19 December 2012. 
Ulf Hammarström. Former director of EDA – Industry and Market (2005-08). Director of the Swedish Defence Export 
Agency (FXM), 2010-2015.  
